Philip Cam has been an inspiration to me in his approach to Philosophy for Children, and I have tried to follow the trail he blazed. He is a master of developing what I call 'practitioner theories' of Philosophy for Children. These are practical theories designed to be useful for practitioners of Philosophy for Children, rather than abstract theories designed to contribute to the scholarship of Philosophy for 
Philip Cam, master of the practitioner theory

Cam is a master of developing what I call 'practitioner theories' (Golding 2014b). I
will explain what this means using an illustration from Cam's work (the question quadrant), and then I will explore another of Cam's practitioner theories, his theory of assessing thinking, and show how this might be elaborated.
I coined the term 'practitioner theory' to describe practical theories designed to be useful in practice, as distinct from abstract theories designed to contribute to a scholarly field (Golding 2014b) . My distinction between practitioner theories and abstract, explanatory theories is similar to Schön's (1983) distinction between practical 'fundamental theories' which have the 'optimal fuzziness' necessary for navigating messy practice, and abstract theories which are characterised by 'unusable precision' (Schön 1983, pp. 319-320) . Practitioner theories are 'fertile' 1 While all scholarly fields might be described as an international Community of Inquiry, where scholars build on the work of other scholars and contribute to an ongoing conversation, I suggest that the international Community of Inquiry around P4C may have been a little special. The scholarly work around P4C was often conceived as 'our' project jointly developed by an international community working together, and as such, even though there are prominent voices, it is harder to tease out who made what contribution. This is different from the more normal situation where researchers compete with each other so they can be seen as making the next important contribution. Furthermore, even though there is disagreement in the P4C international Community of Inquiry, it is frequently in the spirit of advancing our collaborative inquiry, rather than in spirit of attacking and defending positions, as is more common elsewhere.
rather than 'straight-jacketing' (Thomas 2007, p. 46) . So, a Philosophy for Children practitioner theory is a systematic body of knowledge and principles which is handy for practitioners (Golding 2014a), rather than scholarly rigorous.
Both Cam and I are indebted to the pragmatist influence of Dewey for this way of thinking about theory. This conception of practitioner theories also has important parallels in neo-pragmatist views of philosophy, such as Goodman's description of theories that have efficacy in world-making and understanding. Under this view, a practitioner theory is:
Proposing a categorisation or scheme of organisation, calling attention to a way of setting our nets to capture what may be significant likenesses and differences. Argument for the categorisation, the scheme, suggested could not be for its truth, since it has no truth-value, but for its efficacy in world-making We are trying to design a tool for use by certain kinds of agents to accomplish certain sorts of purposes in a certain kind of environment, and our problem is one of practical functional design, not of conceptual analysis or metaphysical speculation about The Good or The Right.
Following from D'Agostino (2007), the method for creating a practitioner theory might be termed 'pragmatist conceptual analysis' because the aim is to design useful concepts-concepts that will help solve the problems of practice-rather than discover the concept already out there. I have previously called this method 'bricolage': I use 'bricolage' as Brandon (2004) does, to describe the practice of devising and using conceptions that are accurate enough for their intended function, where more accurate, precise or comprehensive conceptions would be unwieldy, or overly complex for this function. This is different from how Levi-Strauss (1966) uses 'bricolage' to describe an inferior practice of making do with whatever is at hand. The bricoleur in my sense is not restricted to what is already at hand and can fashion new conceptions, but the conceptions they are interested in are those that are good enough to be efficacious in the current situation, rather than conceptions that will work in all situations for all people. (Golding 2010, p. 23) Developing practitioner theories seems fundamental to Cam's approach to Philosophy for Children, and I have tried to emulate this approach in my own work in Philosophy for Children, educating for thinking, and in education in general. Like
Cam's, my work is primarily designed to be 'handy' (Golding 2014a) and to provide guidance for practitioners (Golding 2013a).
When Cam writes about Philosophy for Children he tends to be a practitionerresearcher, mindful of the issues of practice, rather than an ivory tower researcher.
His theories are firstly for practitioners rather than scholars of Philosophy for Children, as reflected in the fact that most of his publications are for practitioners.
2 But this practitioner focus should not be seen as a sign of 'inferior' scholarship. As I argue in Golding (2014b), we need to legitimise theories developed to contribute directly to practice rather than developed to contribute to the abstract scholarship.
To illustrate what I mean by a practitioner theory I will give a brief account of Cam's Question Quadrant (See Diagram 1). This theory provides an extremely handy way to conceptualise different kinds of questions, which Philosophy for Children teachers can use in their practice. It may not be the most precise analysis of questions, and there will be exceptions, but if it were more precise it would not be as useful for teaching. As Cam says: 2 I don't mean to imply a dualism between practitioner and abstract theories here. There is a continuum of work from pure practitioner theories written solely for practitioners through to pure abstract theories written solely for scholars. Obviously Cam has work written to guide practitioners (e.g. Cam 1995 Cam , 2006 , and work written to contribute to scholarly fields in education (e.g. Cam 2009 Cam , 2010 , and he has produced work in the middle which might have been designed for advancing a scholarly field, but which has practical implications (Cam, 2002) . All I am claiming here is that Cam's work is typically closer to the practitioner end of the continuum, and it is this kind of work that I am paying homage to in this article.
I do not claim that it exhausts all possible questions that students might raise, or that its compartments are completely watertight. Nevertheless, I have found it good enough for practical purposes. (Cam 2006, p. 34) I would go further and argue that it is necessary for such practitioner theories to be imprecise and incomplete, so that they can be useful in the classroom. 
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The question quadrant is a good example of a practitioner theory because it enables teachers to see and to do things differently. Using this quadrant, teachers are able to understand something complex and contestable that might otherwise remain mysterious. They are able to see the differences which were otherwise not apparent.
And the quadrant also helps teachers to do something which they could not do without the theory: they can now ask the intellectual inquiry questions which lead to philosophical inquiry, and they can enable their students to learn how to ask these questions.
A guide to assessing thinking
For the rest of this article I will focus on the practitioner theory which underpins Cam's method for assessing thinking. This practitioner theory has had less attention than Cam's Question Quadrant, and is less well-known, but it is very fruitful and deserves more attention.
Tucked away in the appendix of Thinking Together is 'A Guide to Assessment' (Cam 1995, pp. 101-103) . The method he presents in this Guide is deceptively simple, and deliciously fruitful, which is ideal for a practitioner theory: We can assess thinking by how frequently students demonstrate the thinking moves associated with philosophy (see Table 1 ). This idea of 'thinking moves' is suggested in Dewey (1933) , and developed by others in the Philosophy for Children tradition who identified and described various philosophical moves (Lipman et al. 1980, pp. 110-128; Lipman 1988, 201-206; 2003, ch8; Splitter & Sharp 1995, 9-10 4. The heart of assessing thinking is discerning thinking. Cam's account of assessing thinking is about how you can discern whether thinking is occurring. This is essential for summative assessment, but it is much broader than this. We also need to discern student thinking for any informal assessment, such as observing student thinking or giving formative feedback (Golding 2013b (Golding , 2016 (Golding , 2018 ). 
We should assess whether students are thinking (not merely whether they know how to think
Building on what Cam said about assessing thinking
Cam's practitioner theory about assessing thinking is useful for practitioners, but it also suggests further ways in which practitioners might assess thinking. By building on Cam's six theoretical insights we can make the practitioner theory even more useful, or to use a different metaphor, we can sharpen Cam's theory. This has been my aim for the past 20 years, subsequent to reading Thinking Together, as I have pursued my own inquiry into how to assess thinking. As a result, I developed my own account of thinking moves and milestones (Golding 2009 (Golding , 2014a , and I summarise my most mature account of assessing thinking in Golding (2013b Golding ( , 2016 Golding ( , 2018 .
Cam shows how we can discern and assess student thinking based on how often students employ different thinking moves. This is based on the insight that we learn to think by engaging in the thinking-the more frequent and habitual, the more we have developed as thinkers. But if we also add further insights about how we learn to think, we can extend Cam's theory of assessing thinking, and so show additional ways in which we might discern and assess student thinking. As well as looking at the frequency of thinking moves, we might also assess thinking based on the complexity of the thinking moves, how flexibly students employ them, or how independently, or even the complexity of the task or issue to which students apply a thinking move.
Complexity
We can assess any particular kind of thinking based on the complexity of the student thinking moves. We know that novice thinking can be very simple, while an experienced thinker might make some very sophisticated thinking moves. For example, a novice at giving reasons might give reasons merely by using the word 'because' followed by a reason (or even 'just because'), while someone more experienced might not only use the word 'because' but also give reasons for and against a position, before weighing them up to make a final judgement.
This criterion is developed by adding insights from theories such as Bloom's taxonomy (1956) and Biggs and Tang's Structure of Observed Learning Outcomes or SOLO (2007, pp. 76-81) . Both these theories distinguish different kinds of thinking according to the complexity of the thinking, with more complex thinking being associated with 'higher-order' thinking. Evaluation is 'higher' than merely remembering because it is more complex, and indicates a more sophisticated expression of thinking. Thus, complexity is one way to distinguish 'better' and 'worse' kinds of thinking.
However, although Bloom's taxonomy and SOLO indicate that we can distinguish better and worse thinking according to the complexity of the thinking, this does not allow us to distinguish between better and worse expressions of the same kind of thinking. For examples of this we need to turn to theories such as Mezirow's (1991) dimensions of reflective thinking.
Mezirow argues that we can distinguish between better and worse reflective thinking by looking at the sophistication or complexity of what students do. Simple, 'superficial reflection' involves merely making use of existing knowledge. Complex reflection, which he calls 'critical reflection' or 'premise reflection', involves evaluating why we perceive, think, act and feel as we do, and leads to transforming deep-seated beliefs (Mezirow 1991, p. 108) .
We can apply Mezirow's (1991) model to any kind of thinking and thus assess, for example, 'building on ideas' by the complexity or sophistication of the thinking moves employed: someone who was poor at building on ideas might simply say 'I agree', while someone who was good at building on ideas might also give examples to illustrate the other idea, as well as identifying the implications.
Flexibility
We can assess any particular kind of thinking based on how flexibly students use the particular thinking moves. A poor thinker follows a process of thinking using inflexible, predetermined patterns regardless of the circumstances, while an experienced thinker is able to improvise new patterns in response to the circumstances. For example, someone who was poor at finding reasons to support a position might mechanically employ the thinking move for agreeing, 'I agree with *name+ because *reason+', and this is the only way in which they can give reasons to support a position. However, someone who was more advanced at giving reasons is able to agree in different ways, sometimes inventing new thinking moves when the situation demands. For example, 'I partially agree because …', 'I agree with [idea] because *reason+', 'One reason I agree is … but a reason I disagree is …'
This criterion for assessing thinking is based on research about how we develop metacognitive control or regulation of our thinking (e.g. Flavel 1979; Zohar & David 2009 ), or how we learn to be reflective in our thinking (Perkins 1995) . We start as novice thinkers who cannot manage our thinking processes and instead merely react, then we develop some control over our thinking (perhaps by following a prescriptive process which we apply for all situations), until finally we learn to monitor and manage our thinking and choose appropriate strategies for each situation.
Independence
We can assess any particular kind of student thinking based on how independently they use the thinking moves. This criterion is similar to flexibility. A poor thinker can only use a thinking move when they are told to, while an experienced thinker uses it autonomously. A poor thinker has to be told when and how to use a thinking move, while an experienced thinker notices when it might be a good time to use the thinking move, and judges whether and how to use it. For example, someone who is inexperienced at giving examples has to be told, 'Now you need to give an example to illustrate your idea that it is difficult to be a friend. Remember how we give an example? We say 'An example of how it is difficult to be a friend is …' and then you describe an example of one time when it was difficult for you to be a friend'. Someone who is experienced at giving examples, on the other hand, would have offered an example of their own accord, unaided and unprompted, and they would do this whenever the situation calls for an illustrative example.
This criterion for discerning or assessing thinking is based on the process of learning to think which Dewey calls 'experimental copying ' (1933, ch.14, §1) , and which Vygotsky (1978) calls 'internalisation'. The process involves a learner internalising social interactions so they become part of their personal cognitive processes. This is also similar to Ritchhart's (2002) idea of using 'thinking routines' as a means of internalising thinking moves. Thinking routines are very similar to thinking moves.
By regularly and frequently (routinely) being asked to use a thinking move like 'An example is …', and by hearing others use this same routine, a student eventually internalises it until it becomes a routine but conscious way for them to think.
Complexity of application
We can assess any particular kind of student thinking based on the complexity of the task or issue to which they apply their particular thinking moves. A poor thinker can only apply their thinking moves to simple subject matter, while a more experienced thinker can apply it to more complex subject matter. For example, a student who is inexperienced at clarifying and paraphrasing might only be able to paraphrase what someone said to them if it were one sentence or less and about something concrete that they saw or heard. Someone who is more experienced might be able to paraphrase a one-hour discussion about abstract issues into five main themes or arguments.
This criterion for discerning or assessing thinking has its roots in Piaget's (1978) theory of cognitive development. For Piaget, less sophisticated thinking is concrete, and only applied to concrete, observed situations, while more sophisticated thinking is abstract, and can be applied to abstract ideas. We can use Piaget's insight that concrete thinking is less sophisticated than abstract thinking as a criterion to discern or assess particular kinds of thinking, without having to accept Piaget's other claims that there are fixed, age-based stages of thinking.
Conclusion
My aim in writing this article was to acknowledge the debt I owe to Phil, and to illuminate his contribution, as well as highlighting further work that he has inspired.
First, I argued that one of the special contributions Philip Cam makes to Philosophy for Children is his practitioner theories such as the Question Quadrant, which are designed to be handy guides for practitioners. Then, I focussed on his practitioner theory for discerning and assessing thinking. I unpacked some of the theoretical complexity built into the simple idea that we can assess thinking by how frequently students say and do the things that thinkers say and do. I then expanded this practitioner theory, adding in further criteria for assessing thinking besides frequency: We can discern and assess student thinking based on the complexity, flexibility, and independence of their thinking moves, and on the complexity of the subject matter to which they apply their thinking moves. Although I wrote this article, I hope it might be seen as an example of thinking together with Philip Cam.
